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Symposium Article
The Right to a Genuine Electoral Democracy
Amnon Rubinstein and Yaniv Roznai
Abstract
The right to electoral democracy has long been endorsed by
international law. Yet after dramatic global waves of
democratization, in recent years democracy has been in recession.
The lack of a strong consolidation of democracy in the
international community finds its roots in early faults of
international mechanisms: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which did not explicitly support the right to live in a
democratic regime with a multiparty political system, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
guarantees the right to “genuine elections” but failed to clarify
whether these guarantee required party pluralism. Since half of
the world’s population now live under hybrid or authoritarian
regimes, international law must take strong and progressive
actions for embracing periodic genuine elections as the
foundation of the international community. Steps must be taken
to clarify that single-party elections and alike are incompatible
with genuine elections, as they cannot guarantee the free will of
the electors, and to ensure that election processes are free, fair and
ultimately—genuine.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1992, eminent international law scholar Thomas Franck
published in the American Journal of International Law (AJIL)
his seminal work on The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, which initiated an imperative discussion on the
right to democracy in international law.1 Nearly two decades
later, in two contributions to the European Journal of
International Law (EJIL), Susan Marks shed further light on
various engagements of the ‘emerging right of democratic
governance,” including its legal status and prospects, its
relationship to international peace, the influence of
securitization,2 and the link between human development and
democratic governance.3 In response, Jean d’Aspremont agreed
that the post-1989 practice indicated that democracy had
become a prominent benchmark by which to assess governments’
legitimacy.4 However, d’Aspremont noted that more recent
practices endangered the consolidation of practices that focused
on the democratic origin of governments.5 Instead, modern
practices focused on the manner in which governments exercised
power (for example concentrating more towards the respect for
basic rights than on the exercise of free and fair elections).6 We
wish to continue and contribute to this debate in light of the
events following the Arab Spring and the recent decline of global
democratic institutions.7
The great hope sparked by the Arab Spring was followed by
great disappointment. Aside from the developments in Tunisia,
the Arab Spring has not spawned democratic regimes in the
region but, rather, has given rise to bloodshed which has reached
unimaginably horrifying proportions.8 Due to the presupposition

1. Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992).
2. Susan Marks, What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance?, 22(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 507, 510 (2011).
3. Id. at 515–17.
4. Jean d’Aspremont, The Rise and Fall of Democratic Government in
International Law: A Reply to Susan Marks, 22(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 549, 549
(2011).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Amichai Magen, The Democratic Entitlement in an Era of Democratic
Recession, 4(2) CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 368, 368 (2015).
8. See, e.g., JOHN L. ESPOSITO, TAMARA SONN & JOHN O. VOLL, ISLAM AND
DEMOCRACY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 3 (2015).
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that democratic regimes would have minimized the bloodshed,
and considering concerns about the legitimacy of military
intervention against dictatorial regimes, the debate regarding
the existence of a right to democracy has resurfaced.9
Indeed, at least in Syria, the link between the right to life
and the right to democracy appears stronger than ever.10 Many
refer to the slaughter in Syria as “the Syrian tragedy”11—yet this
is no Greek drama. The daily horrors are not an affliction sent
by gods to punish human beings for their sins. Had Syria been
governed by a democratically elected government, Bashar alAssad’s regime could have been replaced in elections and not in
a revolt with grave human consequences.12 Domestic bloodshed
would have probably been avoided. One of the main reasons for
the deaths of thousands of civilians is plain: where there are no
ballots, there are bullets.13
The right to democracy is not merely a collective right of “a
people”—which is inherently vague and difficult to implement—
but a personal right to live in a democratic government which is
supplementary to the accepted international bill of rights. Just
as the right to life is antecedent to all other rights,14 the right to
live in a democratic regime is central to the right to life and,
more broadly, important to a broader set of rights, since “respect
9. Compare Margaret G. Hermann & Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Ballots, a
Barrier Against the Use of Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military
Intervention, 40(3) J. CONFLICT RESOL. 436, 436 (1996) (explaining that
democracies are generally unlikely to be the target of military intervention),
with REIN MÜLLERSON, REGIME CHANGE: FROM DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORIES
TO FORCIBLE REGIME CHANGE 175–78 (2013) (showing that attempts to expand
the circle of democracy may lead to breaches of peace by justifying foreign
intervention with democratic peace theories).
10. See generally TOM COOPER, SYRIAN CONFLAGRATION: THE SYRIAN CIVIL
WAR 2011–2013, 22–27 (2015) (showing how the lack of democracy resulted in
civilian massacres).
11. See, e.g., Jonathan Stevenson, The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent, 56(3)
SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 121, 121 (2014) (labeling the situation in
Syria as the “Syrian Tragedy”).
12. See generally COOPER, supra note 10, at 9–11 (portraying an overview
on the ongoing conflict in Syria).
13. See Dominic M. Ayine, Ballots as Bullets?: Compliance with Rules and
Norms Providing for the Right to Democratic Governance: An African
Perspective, 10 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 709, 733 (1998).
14. See, e.g., BERTRAND MATHIEU, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN EUROPEANS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE-LAW 15 (2006); B.G. Ramcharan,
The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1985); Christian Tomuschat,
The Right to Life—Legal and Political Foundations, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE 3, 3–
6 (Christian Tomuschat, Evelyne Langrange & Stefan Oeter eds., 2010).
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for human rights . . . greatly depends on the extent of
democracy.”15 Again, this reasoning is instrumental to
understanding the integral relationship between the right to
democracy and the right to life. Democratic regimes in the
Middle East and elsewhere would have minimized, if not
eliminated, the number of civilians who paid for the lack of
democracy in their countries with their lives.
The right to live in a democracy is a “gateway” right through
which the primordial right to life can be achieved,16 as it removes
the threat of arbitrary death at the hands of a tyrannical regime.
Additionally, experience demonstrates that democracies do not
go to war against each other.17 Yet, international law has not yet
satisfactorily guaranteed the right of an individual to live in a
democracy.18
Section II of the article reviews the right to democracy in
international law in light of the main international human
rights instruments. In this section, we argue that the inadequate
recognition of a right to democracy in international law
originates from an unfortunate compromise with the former
Soviet Union allowing a one-party electoral system. Section III
15. F. Menghistu, The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements, in THE RIGHT
LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 80; see Thilo Rensmann,
Munich Alumni and the Evolution of International Human Rights Law, 22(4)
EUR. J. INT’L L. 973, 988 (2011) (describing how Karl Loewenstein, the father of
the right to democracy, claimed that “human rights were not neutral in relation
to the frame of the government. History has shown, and this was also his
personal experience, that human rights can be realized only in a democracy.
Since a democratic constitution was accordingly an indispensable condition for
the effective realization of human rights, an international bill of rights without
this structural condition sine qua non would make no sense.”).
16. Cf. Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 12(3)
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 206–07 (1983) (explaining that the right to democracy is
necessary to uphold other liberal rights).
17. Dean V. Babst, Elective Governments—A Force for Peace, 3 WIS.
SOCIOLOGIST 9, 10 (1964); JOANNE GOWA, BALLOTS AND BULLETS: THE ELUSIVE
DEMOCRATIC PEACE 3 (2000); see DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael
E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1995). But see EDWARD
D. MANSFIELD & JACK SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES GO TO WAR 7 (2005) (“Although mature democracies have never
fought a war against each other, incomplete transitions from autocracy toward
democracy are fraught with the danger of violent conflict in states whose
political institutions are weak.”); James D. Fearson & David D. Laitin,
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97(1) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 84–85 (2003)
(detailing how the risk of internal conflict or civil war rises in democratizing
states with weak institutions).
18. See Marks, supra note 2, at 522 (explaining how, despite an emerging
entitlement, a right to democracy has not been fully established in international
law).
TO
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reviews regional efforts for the promotion of the right to
democracy in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. Section IV
discusses the current reality in which, notwithstanding the right
to democracy, only half of the world’s countries are considered
full or flawed democracies. This points to a failure of
international law to promote democracy. Section V outlines our
modest proposals for strengthening the right to a genuine
electoral democracy. We argue that the international community
should make a clear statement that genuine elections require a
multiparty and pluralist electoral system. Moreover, we call for
an obligatory monitoring system that is overseen the United
Nations (U.N.).
II. THE RIGHT TO ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. THE ORIGINAL SIN
The U.N. Charter opens with the lofty but empty phrase
“[we the peoples]”.19 This phrase, which is modeled after the
Preamble of the United States Constitution, seems to express a
democratic basis for the U.N.20 Hans Kelsen criticized this
opening, stating that the U.N. Charter is an international treaty
concluded by governments’ representatives, not representatives
of the people, and that some of the represented states do not
acknowledge the political ideology of popular sovereignty.21
Moreover, democracy is neither mentioned in the Charter nor is
a commitment to democratic ideals a condition for admission as
a member state.22 In fact, many non-democratic regimes are
U.N. member states.23 Furthermore, the U.N. has itself been
criticized as a non-democratic institution by virtue of the veto
power accorded to the five permanent members of the Security
19. U.N. Charter pmbl.
20. Bardo Fassbender, ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations: Constituent
Power and Constitutional Form in International Law, in THE PARADOX OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 269,
286 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007).
21. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 7 (1950).
22. See generally THOMAS D. GRANT, ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS:
CHARTER ARTICLE 4 AND THE RISE OF UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATION 21 (2009)
(discussing a summary of criteria for admissions to the United Nations).
23. Sean Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and
Governments, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 556 (1999).
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Council.24
The right to live under a democratic form of government
formally came into existence as an international legal right in
1948.25 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, expresses the concept
of democracy by stating in Article 21 that:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government
of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service
in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic
and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.26
Depending on how the vague term “genuine elections” is
interpreted, the right to vote is thus obliquely mentioned.
However, this phrasing does not seem to encompass a right to
vote in contested, multi-party elections, nor the right to present
a candidate or establish a party. And in fact, as Marc Plattner
writes, “the provision of Article 21 calling for ‘genuine’ elections
has been consistently violated by many UN [sic] member states
with one-party or other dictatorial governments.”27 As such, it is

24. Same Varayudej, The Right to Democracy in International Law: Its
Implications for Asia, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2006).
25. Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal
Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 289, 290
(1995).
26. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
27. MARC F. PLATTNER, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BORDERS?: GLOBAL
CHALLENGES TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 67 (2007). See also Franck, supra note 1,
at 64 (“At the time, only UN [sic] members outside the socialist, Arab and Latin
American blocs took this as a restatement of conditions already prevailing in
their polis. With rapid decolonization, the proportion of UN [sic] members
actually practicing free and open electoral democracy began to shrink further
under the aegis of one-party modernizing authoritarianism in Africa and Asia.
Nevertheless, even in that relatively hostile atmosphere, few states were willing
openly to block the textual evolution of a specific electoral entitlement, however
many mental reservations their regimes may have harbored.”).
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an empty right to vote in a Soviet-style one-party dictatorial
state—the attitude of the Declaration toward democracy having
been tailored to make it palatable to the U.S.S.R. Communist
system.28 During the drafting sessions, the Belgian delegate
proposed to include the words “according to the party system”
after the word “periodic”—pointing to the right to form political
parties—since “a duality or plurality of parties . . . was essential
to the efficient functioning of the democratic system.”29 However,
the Belgian delegate withdrew his amendment after an objection
by the Soviet delegate who reasoned that “under the prevailing
[Soviet] system . . . [there is] no justification for the creation of
other parties . . . [and that the amendment was] absolutely
irreconcilable with the social structure of certain member
States.”30
It is, therefore, apparent that the UDHR does not explicitly
support the right to live in a democratic regime with a
multiparty political system with all the accompanying rights
such as the right to propose candidates or establish parties.31
Moreover, the UDHR does not have binding force and does not
incorporate any institutional enforcement mechanisms to
ensure the observance of the rights declared therein.32 Christina
Cerna writes that for decades, until the end of the Cold War and
the fall of the Berlin Wall, Article 21 was honored more in the
breach than in the observance.33 Indeed, Hurst Hannum casts
doubts on whether Article 21 actually reflects international law
as practiced: “Despite the arguments of some that a ‘right to
democracy’ may be emerging as a norm of international
customary law, it is apparent that many states have not
accepted Article 21’s guarantee of the right to participate in the
political life of one’s country.”34
28. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 58–61 (1999).
29. Id. at 60.
30. Id. at 61.
31. UDHR, supra note 26, art. 20, ¶ 1 (declaring only that “Everyone has
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”); see Morsink, supra
note 28, at 60 (showing how, although, previous drafts expressly stated that
freedom of peaceful assembly included the right to form political parties, this
language was dropped in the final draft).
32. Mary Ann Gelndon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 2 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2004).
33. Cerna, supra note 25, at 290.
34. Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 287, 348
(1995) (emphasis added).
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B. GENUINE ELECTIONS

In contrast to the UDHR, Article 25 to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), which
is currently binding upon those 168 States that have ratified it,35
sets out a much less vague arrangement which corresponds to
the recognized principles of democratic regimes:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression
of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.36
Because it guarantees the rights to freedom of expression,37
peaceful assembly,38 and freedom of association,39 the ICCPR
lays out the legal basis for the right to democracy under
international law.40 This conception of democratic governance is
stated “at a high level of generality—high enough to mask
important substantive differences among states on the content
of those principles.”41 However, it is determinate enough to
35. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 51, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
36. Id. art. 25.
37. Id. art. 19.
38. Id. art. 21.
39. Id. art. 22.
40. See Human Rights Committee General Comment 25, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, ¶ 12 (Aug. 27, 1996) (“Freedom of expression,
assembly and association are essential conditions for the effective exercise of
the right to vote and must be fully protected.”).
41. See David Wippman, Defending Democracy Through Foreign
Intervention, 19 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 659, 664 (1997) (claiming that “[t]he
international community has long paid lip service to basic principles of
democratic governance.”); see also Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a
Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77, 77 (1988) (noting that the right to
political participation “expresses less a vital concept meant to universalize
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establish not only rights for citizens, but additionally,
obligations for States. These obligations include holding periodic
elections using the secret ballot and ensuring that elections
manifest a genuine and a free expression of the will of the
people.42 Yet, Gregory Fox notes, “[g]iven Cold War tensions, it
is not surprising that the drafters failed to clarify whether the
guarantee of a ‘genuine election’. . . required party pluralism.”43
In fact, Fox remarks that the ICCPR’s travaux preparatoire
hardly addressed the meaning of the term “genuine,” and the
issue of party pluralism was not discussed.44 The single effort to
define the meaning of “genuine” elections came from the Chilean
delegate.45 He stated, at a late stage in the drafting process, that
“[t]he adjective ‘genuine’ had been used to guarantee that all
elections of every kind faithfully reflected the opinion of the
population and to protect the electors against government
pressure and fraud.”46 Thus, originally, Article 25 did not
prohibit one-party elections.
In the absence of an explicit reference to multi-party
elections, some states have interpreted this provision as
allowing one-party elections. These states claim that genuine
electoral choice does not require the existence of multiple
political parties or that multiple parties would exacerbate ethnic
divisions in deeply divided societies and would bring violence.47
But in order for elections to reflect the free will of the voting
population, it would seem imperative that candidates and
political parties representing factions and divisions in society be
able to actively contest the elections in order to give these
certain practices than a bundle of concepts, sometimes complementary but
sometimes antagonistic . . . . [O]ften it becomes another weapon of rhetorical
battle, a convenient, even authoritative concept through which each of the
world’s ideological blocs, infusing the right with its own understandings,
attacks the other for violating those understandings.”).
42. THE CARTER CTR., STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO SUPPORT
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND GENUINE ELECTIONS 26–27 (2012),
http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/dri_report_strengthening_democra
tic_governance_.pdf.
43. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 55 (Gregory
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
44. Id. at 56. Travaux préparatoire means the preparatory work of a treaty
which can be taken as supplementary means of treaty interpretation. See art.
32 of the United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May
1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 56–57.
47. Id. at 56.
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factions a voice.48
In any case, the interpretation that Article 25 supports oneparty elections no longer seems to be widely accepted.49 Further,
it has been stated that “[t]extual determinacy, once again, is
gradually being augmented by process determinacy under the
auspices of the Human Rights Committee, which is authorized
to monitor compliance.”50 For instance, upon receiving a state
party’s periodic report, the Human Rights Committee
(Committee) usually questions the state delegates about
whether opposition parties are permitted, to what extent these
parties act freely, and whether any parties have been banned.51
It would, therefore, appear that the Committee has consistently
expressed its doubts that one-party elections are indeed
“genuine.”52
An example in which the Committee came close to explicitly
dealing with the question of whether a state’s election was free
concerned Iran’s tenth Presidential election in 2009. In its third
periodic review of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Committee
raised its concern about the various flaws in the electoral
process.53 The Committee was concerned with the right of the
Guardian Council to reject candidates to the Majlis, noting that
out of more than 450 prospective candidates, only four
candidates were approved.54 The Committee also noted that
international observers were prohibited from monitoring the
election results and that the election results were approved by
Ayatollah Khamenei before certification by the Guardian
Council.55 Additionally, the Committee discussed the arrest of
dozens of political opposition members in February 2011 as well
as the dissolution by court order of two pro-reform political
48. See id. at 57 (showing how a state would have to bar candidates
representing different factions in order to violate the right to elections); see also
Christopher C. Joyner, The United Nations and Democracy, 3 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 339, 351 (1999) (explaining how legitimate democracies need
transparency to prevent negative reactions).
49. Gregory H. Fox, Election Monitoring: The International Legal Setting,
19(3) WIS. INT’L L.J. 295, 299 (2000); Fox, supra note 43, at 89.
50. Franck, supra note 1, at 64.
51. See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on Islamic
Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. CCRP/C/IRN/CO/3 (Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Iran
Report] (detailing the conclusions drawn after questions Iran about their
treatment of opposition parties).
52. Fox, supra note 43, at 57.
53. Iran Report, supra note 51, ¶ 15.
54. Id. ¶ 29.
55. Id.
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parties.56 As a result, the Committee called upon the state to
amend its law, to ensure that it was in conformity with the rights
guaranteed in Article 25, and to take adequate steps to
guarantee that elections were conducted in a free and
transparent manner.57
The Committee elaborated on the meaning of Article 25 and
its doubts toward one-party elections further in other cases. In a
1993 decision, the Committee held that a one-party system that
restricts political activity outside the only organized political
party imposes inherent limitations on genuine electoral choice
and “an unreasonable restriction on the [ . . . ] right to ‘take part
in the conduct of public affairs.’”58 That decision came as a result
of a petition by a Zambian citizen who attempted to run for
Parliamentary election as a member of an opposition party that
was banned under Zambia’s one-party system.59 Accordingly, he
was prevented from participating in the electoral campaign and
was ultimately detained for thirty-one months on charges of
belonging to the banned party.60 In a decision concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), a Zairian
national, Andre Alphonse Mpaka-Nsusu, presented his
candidacy for the presidency of Zaire in conformity with existing
Zairian law.61 After the rejection of his candidacy, Mpaka-Nsusu
submitted a proposal to the government requesting recognition
of a second party in Zaire, the Federal Nationalist Party.62 While
Mpaka-Nsusu claimed that he acted in accordance with Article
4 of the 1967 Constitution which envisaged a two-party system,
he was arrested on July 1, 1979, later detained without trial, and
banished to his village of origin for an indefinite period.63
Mpaka-Nsusu then fled the country.64 Based upon the rejection
of his candidacy, the Committee found a violation of Article 25.65
56. Id.
57. Iran Report, supra note 51, ¶ 9.
58. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. 314/1988, ¶ 6.6,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (July 14, 1993).
59. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.1.
60. Id. ¶ 6.3.
61. Human Rights Comm., Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire Views, ¶¶ 1.1–1.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/27/D/157/1983 (Mar. 26, 1983).
62. Id. ¶ 1.2.
63. Id. ¶ 1.3. Concerning Communication No. 1354/2005, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/100/D/1354/2005 (Oct. 19, 2010).
64. Id.
65. Id. ¶ 10.
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The Committee weighed in on another decision that
concerned a refusal to register a candidate for the 2004 elections
to the House of Representatives in Belarus.66 Based on grounds
of providing incorrect personal data, the Committee noted that
“article 25 of the Covenant secures to every citizen the right and
the opportunity to be elected at genuine periodic elections
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2, paragraph
1, including political opinion.”67 In a 2005 decision, the
Committee found that Cameroon violated Article 25(b) for
depriving a person’s right to vote and to be elected, without any
objective and reasonable grounds, holding that “persons who are
otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by
reason of political affiliation.”68
In its 1996 General Comment on Article 25, the Committee
emphasized the centrality of the electoral process to an effective
democratic system, noting that it “lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people . . . .”69 Yet, the
only references to the ‘genuineness’ of the elections are that:
. . . [g]enuine periodic elections . . . are essential to
ensure the accountability of representatives for the
exercise of the legislative or executive powers vested in
them. Such elections must be held at intervals which are
not unduly long and which ensure that the authority of
government continues to be based on the free expression
of the will of electors.70
Additionally, it held that:
. . . elections must be conducted fairly and freely on a
periodic basis within a framework of laws guaranteeing
the effective exercise of voting rights. Persons entitled to
66. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. 1354/2005, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/100/D/1354/2005 (Oct. 19, 2010).
67. Id. ¶ 6.6.
68. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Concerning Communication No. 1134/2002, ¶ 5.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/83/D/1134/2002 (May 10, 2005).
69. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Under Article 40,
Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
General Comment 25 (27), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996).
70. Id. ¶ 9.
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vote must be free to vote for any candidate for election
and for or against any proposal submitted to referendum
or plebiscite, and free to support or to oppose
government, without undue influence or coercion of any
kind which may distort or inhibit the free expression of
the elector’s will. Voters should be able to form opinions
independently, free of violence or threat of violence,
compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of
any kind . . . . The results of genuine elections should be
respected and implemented.71
These statements do not refer to multiparty systems, yet
prima facie, one might infer the importance of having multiplechoices when these statements are read together with other
paragraphs which protect the “free choice of candidates,”72 “the
right of persons to stand for election,”73 and “the right to form
and join political associations.”74 The General Comment stresses
that “although the Covenant does not impose any particular
electoral system, any system operating in a State party must be
compatible with the rights protected by Article 25 and must
guarantee and give effect to the free expression of the will of the
electors . . . .”75 This is a specific manifestation of the U.N.’s
general approach not to promote any specific form of government
or a particular model or system for democracy.76 This approach
was clearly demonstrated in 2008 when a complaint was lodged
against Spain on the basis that the Spanish monarchy is not
subject to free and public elections. The Committee noted that
Article 25 “does not impose a specific political model or
structure” and “that a constitutional monarchy based on
separation of powers is not in itself contrary to Article 25 of the
Covenant.”77
71. Id. ¶ 19.
72. Id. ¶ 15.
73. Id. ¶ 17.
74. Id. ¶ 26.
75. Id. ¶ 21.
76. Democracy, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/issuesdepth/democracy/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) (“It is also important to note that
the United Nations does not advocate for a specific model of government, but
promotes democratic governance as a set of values and principles that should
be followed for greater participation, equality, security and human
development.”); see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Democratization, U.N.
Doc. A/51/761, ¶ 10 (Dec. 20, 1996); Joyner, supra note 48, at 350.
77. Human Rights Comm., Decision of the Human Rights Committee
Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
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Indeed, in its review of the parties’ adherence to the ICCPR,
the Committee deals with alleged violations of Article 25.78 Yet,
most of the decisions focus on electoral problems within
governments in which multiparty systems exist, and the
Committee rarely interferes in authoritarian regimes which do
not conduct genuine elections.79 As Kofele-Kale notes,
international responses to violations of the right to democracy
are very limited and are almost never directed toward the
removal of repressive and authoritarian governments.80
The importance of the abovementioned statements
concerning Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Iran should not be overlooked because they assist in advancing
international law and the interpretation of the ICCPR in a more
genuine democratic direction. Yet, apart from them, there is no
Political Rights Concerning Communication No. 1745/2007, ¶ 3.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/92/D/1745/2007 (Apr. 23, 2008).
78. Id. ¶ 2.1.
79. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee
Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No.
2155/2012 (Mar. 25, 2014) (discussing Lithuania’s compliance with the ICCPR);
Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5,
Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. 1410/2005 (Mar. 21, 2011)
(discussing Russia’s compliance with the ICCPR); Human Rights Comm., Views
of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Concerning
Communication No. 1553/2007, CCPR/C/95/D/1553/2007 (Apr. 24, 2009)
(discussing Belarus’s compliance with the ICCPR); Human Rights Comm.,
Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Concerning Communication No. 1373/2005, CCPR/C/93/D/1373/2005 (Aug. 4,
2008) (discussing Sri Lanka’s compliance with the ICCPR); Human Rights
Comm., Views of the HumanRubinstein Rights Committee Under Article 5,
Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. 993-995/2001,
CCPR/C/85/D/993-995/2001 (Oct. 28 2005) (discussing France’s compliance with
the ICCPR); Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee
Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No.
884/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/884/1999 (July 31, 2001) (discussing Latvia’s
compliance with the ICCPR); Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human
Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Concerning
Communication No. 500/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/500/1992 (Apr. 4, 1995)
(discussing the Netherlands’ compliance with the ICCPR).
80. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Global Community’s Role in Promoting the
Right to Democratic Governance and Free Choice in the Third World, 11 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 205, 212 (2005).
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clear, unequivocal clarification as to the nature of genuine
elections, and, a fortiori, no duty has been imposed upon state
parties to hold multiparty or multicandidate elections with all
their accompanied rights. We are still lacking an explicit
recognition of the right to live in a “genuine” democratic
government, and “genuine[ss]” remains open to interpretation.
This allows different types of dictatorships to claim that, due to
the election conducted in the state, their regimes were
democratic (even those in which a single candidate receives
ninety-nine percent of the vote).81 Yannick Lécuyer writes that
national governments have resisted “a right to free elections in
international law,” attempting to put obstacles in the terms of
its recognition, applicability and effectiveness since it was seen
as a limitation on national sovereignty.82 Accordingly, while the
U.N. “is constantly promoting democracy, it is less concerned
with the quality of democracy practices by its members.”83 If the
omission from the U.N.’s Charter and human rights treaties of
the right to live under a democratic regime stemmed originally
from the need to accommodate and placate victorious Soviet
Communism after World War II,84 it is today dictated by the
composition of the U.N. itself—the majority of whose members
are non-democratic in some way—as well as by the fear of
causing a split within the international community.
III.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. EUROPE
In the European Union (EU), things are markedly different.
81. See, e.g., Bruce Pannier, Turkmenistan: Explaining the Presidential
Election, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Feb. 08, 2007, 13:03 GMT),
https://www.rferl.org/a/1074577.html (discussing Saparmurat Niyazov’s 1992
victory with 99.8% turnout and 99.5% of the vote in a competition where he ran
unopposed); The World of 100% Election Victories, BBC NEWS: MAGAZINE
MONITOR (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor26527422 (discussing lopsided electoral victories in authoritarian states).
82. YANNICK LÉCUYER, THE RIGHT TO FREE ELECTIONS 9 (2014).
83. Id. See also Varayudej, supra note 24, at 5.
84. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OCTOBER 1946 TO NOVEMBER 1947, at
1778, 2552 (2013), http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/UDHR2013
FullText.pdf (discussing the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics’ objections to
requiring periodic elections; and then discussing the Union of Socialist Soviet
Republics’ proposal of an amendment requiring only that the government
“consider” the will of the people).
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Under the Lisbon Treaty, a state cannot become a member of the
EU if it does not prove that it has a democratic regime.85 Any
country seeking membership must conform to the conditions set
out in Article 49 to the Treaty,86 the principles laid down in
Article 287—democracy being one of them—and the principles
established under Title II of the Treaty on European Union
concerning the democratic principles of the EU itself.88
Moreover, the criteria established by the Copenhagen European
Council in 1993 must be met.89 The Madrid European Council in
1995 and the transatlantic agenda of “promoting peace and
stability, democracy and development around the world”
strengthened those criteria.90
The result of these cumulative conditions is that a new EU
member state must demonstrate the political stability of its
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities. The same
apply to the Council of Europe. The Preamble to the Statute
creating the Council of Europe states that the member states are
“reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values
which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true
source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law,
principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy.”91
Furthermore, a special body—the European Commission for
Democracy through Law, known as the Venice Commission—
reviews and recommends constitutional and legislative changes
in countries asking to be accepted into the council and those that
are already members, and has been active in the electoral field.92
85. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 49, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J.
(C 306) 1.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 2.
88. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 9–12, Dec.
13 2007, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1. On whether the EU should play a role in protecting
liberal democracy in Member States, see Jan-Werner Müller, Should the EU
Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law Inside Member States?, 21(2) EUR. L. J.
141 (2015).
89. Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U.
BULL, No. 6, ¶ 1.13, http://aei.pitt.edu/1443/1/Copenhagen_june_1993.pdf
(1993).
90. Madrid European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL.,
No. 12, at 24, http://aei.pitt.edu/1452/1/madrid_dec_1995.pdf (1995).
91. Statute of the Council of Europe, pmbl, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm.
92. See Elections and Referendums, Political Parties, VENICE COMMISSION,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Elections_and_Referendum
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As democracy is considered one of the pillars of the
European constitutional heritage and of the Council of Europe,
together with human rights and the rule of law, elections
represent a particular aspect of the European constitutional
heritage which is often termed “European electoral heritage.”93
This heritage includes core electoral principles such as
universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage, alongside a set
of principles without which genuine democratic elections cannot
be held, such as fundamental rights, the stability of electoral law
and effective procedural guarantees.94
In addition to these mechanisms, one should mention
European human rights law. Whereas the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) does not contain any provisions on
participatory rights, Article 3 of the Protocol I to the ECHR
stipulates the right to free elections “at reasonable intervals by
secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature.”95 Read literally, this provision seems even narrower
than Article 25 of the ICCPR as it does not require “genuine
elections,” and, importantly, does not refer to elections as an
individual right, but rather as a duty which is imposed upon the
state parties.96 Nevertheless, the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have interpreted this provision
broadly according to the abovementioned “European electoral
heritage” and draw from it both “the right to vote” and “the right
to stand for election.”97 While the ECtHR has afforded state
parties a wide margin of discretion in structuring their electoral
s (last visited Oct. 2, 2017); Opinions and Studies in the Electoral Field, VENICE
COMMISSION,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_Opinions_
and_studies (last visited Oct. 2, 2017). See generally Maartje De Visser, A
Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice Commission in Processes of
Domestic Constitutional Reform, 63(4) AM. J. COM. L. 963 (2015) (explaining the
Venice Commission’s advising and assisting role on states’ constitutional reform
projects).
93. LÉCUYER, supra note 82, at 28.
94. See Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters—Guidelines and
Explanatory Report, Opinion no. 190/2002, VENICE COMMISSION (Oct. 30,
2002), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CD
L-AD(2002)023-e.
95. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
96. Fox, supra note 43, at 59.
97. See Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, App. No. 9267/81, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1
(1987); D. J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 920–951 (3d ed. 2014).
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systems,98 it is clear that this margin presupposes a multiparty
system which allows diverse and pluralist dialogue. The ECtHR
commented on this in its decision concerning Turkey’s banning
of political parties that support Kurdish separatist movements
based upon their threat to the state’s unity and territorial
integrity.99 It held that “it is the essence of democracy to allow
diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even
those that call into question the way a State is currently
organised, provided they do not harm democracy itself.”100
B. AFRICA
Processes of democratization are also reflected in Africa’s
regional law. Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights guarantees every citizen “the right to participate
freely in the government of his country, either directly or
through freely chosen representatives . . . .”101 While the Charter
protects the “free choice,” in contrast with Article 25 of the
ICCPR, it neither addresses discrimination, universal suffrage,
or a secret ballot, nor stipulates that electoral choice must reflect
the free expression of the electors’ will. Lacking such stipulation,
the Charter may be interpreted as allowing one-party
elections.102
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the African
Commission on Human Rights has issued a series of statements
articulating the principles of electoral democracy as “based on
the consent of the people freely expressed by them” and
condemning military governments as clearly violating
fundamental principles of democracy.103 The principles of
electoral democracy were reaffirmed in the 2007 African Charter
on Democracy, Elections and Governance,104 of which, according
98. Gitonas v. Greece, App. No. 18747/91, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 691, ¶ 39
(1997); Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 361,
¶ 64 (1999).
99. Socialist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, ¶
47 (1998).
100. Id.
101. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, Art. 13, June 27, 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, at 5.
102. Fox, supra note 43, at 66; Ayine, supra note 13, at 719.
103. Organization of African Unity, Eighth Annual Activity Report of the
Commission on Human and People’s Rights (June 26–28, 1995),
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/ACHPR1.htm.
104. African Union, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
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to Article 17 “State Parties re-affirm their commitment to
regularly holding transparent, free and fair elections . . . .”105
Notwithstanding these principles, democratization in Africa has
taken a rather slow pace, with democratic reforms on the one
hand but striking electoral frauds on the other.106
C. LATIN AMERICA
Article 23.1(b) of the American Convention on Human
Rights follows Article 25 of the ICCPR with minor modifications.
Article 23.1(b) guarantees the right “to vote and to be elected in
genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression
of the will of the voters.”107 Due to the region’s particular
circumstances, the early jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights mainly focused on states with
grave violations of human rights and in which ruling parties had
completely suspended representative government.108 The
Commission emphasized that the core issue under Article 23 is
whether elections are “genuine” which, according to the
Commission, means one without intimidation, fraud, and
harassment, and that reflect the voters’ will.109 Importantly, the
Commission has held that one-party states are inherently
coercive, and consequently, one-party states are incapable of
holding authentic elections.110 According to the Commission, the
principle of pluralism is characteristic of a representative
democracy, and in the absence of which, elections cannot be free
and genuine.111
In addition to this jurisprudence, one should mention the
Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001, which was adopted
Governance, pmbl, http://www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf.
105. Id. art. 17.
106. Kofele-Kale, supra note 80, at 232.
107. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 23.1(b), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
108. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc.17, Ch. XII(a), ¶ 49 (1985) [hereinafter
Chile Report].
109. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II. 76, doc. 16, rev. 2, Ch. VIII, ¶ 3 (1989).
110. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba: Seventh Report,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.61, doc. 29, rev. I, Ch. I, ¶ 30 (1983);
id. Ch. II, ¶ 38.
111. Chile Report, supra note 108, ¶ 96.
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by a special session of the General Assembly of the Organization
of American States with the central aim of strengthening and
upholding democratic institutions in the nations of the
Americas.112 Article 3 of the Charter explicitly states that
“essential elements of representative democracy include, inter
alia . . . the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on
secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the
sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political
parties and organizations . . . .”113 Thus, the Charter recognized
the importance of pluralism and the strengthening of political
parties.114 Over a decade ago, it was argued that the Democratic
Charter is one of the most recent examples of an emerging
international law norm of democratic governance.115
IV.

A RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY IN A NONDEMOCRATIC WORLD

A. HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY EMERGED?
It might simply be realpolitik, or perhaps the great number
of non-democratic states within the U.N., but the fact is that the
gap remains today. The inconsistency between the various
standards of electoral democracy around the world began with
the compromise with the U.S.S.R. True, the U.N. General
Assembly and the Human Rights Council have time and again
reaffirmed the right to live in a democratic government. For
example, in one of its resolutions in support of governments’
efforts to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies,
the General Assembly encouraged “Member States to promote
democratization and to make additional efforts to identify
possible steps to support the efforts of Governments to promote
and consolidate new or restored democracies.”116 In April 1999,
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution
1999/57 concerning “Promotion of the right to democracy,” which

112. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter
¶ 1, 40 I.L.M. 1289.
113. Id. art. 3. See Timothy D. Rudy, A Quick Look at the Inter-American
Democratic Charter of the OAS: What Is It and Is It Legal, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L
L. & COMM. 237, 243 (2005).
114. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 43 (2006).
115. Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, In Defense of Democracy, 35(2) U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 283, 287 (2004).
116. G.A. Res. 51/31, art. 6 (Jan. 10, 1997).
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“[a]ffirms that democracy fosters the full realization of all
human rights,”117 and that the rights of democratic governance
include, inter alia “[t]he right of universal and equal suffrage, as
well as free voting procedures and periodic and free elections”118
and “the right of political participation . . . .”119 In December
2000, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that “[c]alls
upon States to promote and consolidate democracy;”120 however,
these dramatic declarations were not accompanied by sufficient
steps for their fulfillment.121
So, based on various human rights instruments, regional
developments, and countless declarations by international
bodies, a line of scholars have been announcing the development
of a new human right: the right to participate in the political
process within a democratic government.122 Most famously,
perhaps, Franck argued that we were in the course of
consolidating a right to democracy, which was once limited to
only a few western states: “This newly emerging ‘law’—which
requires democracy to validate governance . . . [is] becoming a
requirement of international law applicable to all and
implemented through global standards, with the help of regional
and international organizations.”123 To support his conclusion,
Franck relied upon democratization processes that took place
towards the end of the Twentieth century, particularly the
democratic revolution which occurred at the time in the former
Soviet Union and in Latin America.124 Laurence Whitehead
claimed in 2004 that “[d]emocratization is now more commonly
viewed as the norm rather than the exception,”125 and as
Amichai Magen writes, “over the period 1990–2005 we observe a
structural shift in the status of democracy, as an ideal and model
of government, in the international system.”126 Still, many
117. Economic and Social Council Res. 1999/57, art. 1 (Apr. 28, 1999).
118. Id. art. 2(d).
119. Id. art. 2(e).
120. G.A. Res. 55/96, art. 1 (Dec. 4, 2000).
121. See, e.g., Niels Petersen, The Principle of Democratic Teleology in
International Law, 34(1) BROOK. J. INT’L L. 33, 38 (2009).
122. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539, 551 (1992).
123. Franck, supra note 1, at 47.
124. Id. at 46–47.
125. Laurence Whitehead, Democratization with the Benefit of Hindsight:
The Changing International Components, in THE U.N. ROLE IN PROMOTING
DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN IDEALS AND REALITY 135, 135 (Edward Newman &
Roland Rich eds., 2004).
126. Magen, supra note 7, at 378.
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states—some of which are very active in the U.N., and which
comprise more than one-third of humanity—do not see
themselves bound by this “new norm” of democratization.127
In contrast, some argue that there is no right to democracy,
and that it is undesirable for such a right to exist. Matthew
Lister, for example, relies on John Rawls to argue that
recognizing the right to democracy is undesirable because such
recognition would justify democratic states’ intervention in nondemocratic states.128 Intervention may occur even if the states
are not systematically responsible for grave human rights
abuses (such as Saddam Hussain’s Iraq), but rather what he
terms “decent” non-democracies (such as the Kingdom of Jordan)
and even in states which are advancing toward decentness.129
The focus of this article is not on the issue of pro-democratic
intervention, which deserves its own treatment.130 We would
mention, however, that even if one takes seriously the
“responsibility to protect” doctrine and humanitarian
intervention,131 it is hard to see how the right to democracy
would justify a use of force. The responsibility to protect doctrine
acknowledges that the prime responsibility for protecting the
people rests upon the sovereign state.132 However, when a state
is unable or unwilling to protect its own people, or when the state
itself poses a threat to its people, responsibility to protect then
rests upon the international community.133 Humanitarian
intervention generally refers to the use of force against a state
in order to prevent or reduce the suffering of that state’s
citizens.134 Yet, for the use of force to be justified, even on these
accounts, the threat must be grave, the main aim of the military
127. See, e.g., Cerna, supra note 25, at 293.
128. Matthew Lister, There Is No Human Right to Democracy. But May We
Promote It Anyway?, 48(2) STAN. J. INT’L L. 257, 263 (2012).
129. Id. at 273.
130. See, e.g., Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of
New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore
Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 329, 329 (1995); W. Michael Reisman,
Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
794, 794 (1995); Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78
AM. J. INT’L L. 645, 648 (1984).
131. The two concepts are not identical. See, e.g., Erfaun Norooz,
Responsibility to Protect and Its Applicability in Libya and Syria, 9(3) Vienna
J. Int’l Const. L. Thesis 1, 1 (2015).
132. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS
ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 46 (2008).
133. ALEX J. BELLAMY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 2–3 (2015).
134. See THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 7 (3d ed. 2016).
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action must be to stop or prevent the threat, the use of force must
be exercised only after all other peaceful means for resolving the
conflict have been exhausted, and when the implications of the
military intervention will not be more severe than nonintervention.135 In the absence of clear rules, a wide elaboration
of the emerging humanitarian exception to the prohibition on
the use of force might lead to the use of force for solving not only
survival humanitarian crises, but also a wide range of crises.136
In any event, even these grounds for intervention are still
contested. In 2005, at the world summit, “the states of the world
confirmed that the UN [sic] Charter’s provisions regarding the
use of force and its exceptions . . . were sufficient to address the
wide variety of threats to peace and international security.”137
Furthermore, “[a]ny forcible intervention without UN [sic]
Security Council authorization and which is not covered by the
conditions for the right of self-defense—even one which is driven
by moral and humanitarian considerations—is a violation of
state sovereignty and prima facie of the prohibition on the use of
force.138 This supposition seems to preclude the possibility of a
pro-democratic intervention. Even if a full right to democracy is
recognized, this would not justify a military intervention merely
on the basis that a state is non-democratic.139 One has to
distinguish between the right to democratic entitlement and a
separate question of the right to use force in order to establish,
restore or maintain democracy—which is not supported by
either state practice or opinio juris.140 Even a recognized right to
democracy would not prevail over the jus cogens prohibition on
the use of force as enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter.141
Moreover, it is also questionable whether a forcible
intervention of a foreign state can actually bring about
democracy in general—and a stable democracy in particular—
especially where a social and cultural basis for democracy was

135. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, ¶ 207, U.N. Doc A/59/565, (Dec. 2, 2004).
136. Yaniv Roznai, The Insecurity of Human Security, 32(1) WIS. INT’L L.J.
95, 121–22 (2014).
137. Id. at 118. See G.A. Res. 60/1, World Summit Outcome, ¶ 79 (Sept. 16,
2005).
138. Roznai, supra note 136, at 118.
139. Varayudej, supra note 24, at 17.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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lacking in the first place.142
We raise the question of forcible intervention only to
mention some of the objections to a right to democracy. In any
case, we refer to positive international law which recognizes a
right to democracy, as we have seen in Section II of the article.
We raise concerns as to why this right is hardly debated when it
comes to clearly undemocratic states and is not granted
unequivocal declaration, and to highlight the gloomy reality that
we live in a non-democratic world.
B. NON-DEMOCRATIC WORLD
It is said that “a political system is either a democracy or
not. The latter, in contrast, is gradual—democracy is a question
of degree. Both concepts, however, are complementary and not
mutually exclusive.”143 The Economist’s Democracy Index 2016
distinguishes between four types of regimes: “full democracies,”
“flawed democracies,” “hybrid regimes,” and “authoritarian
regimes,” which are based upon five categories: electoral process
and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government,
political participation, and political culture.144 According to the
2016 index, only nineteen countries (compared to twenty-four in
2014) are considered full democracies, fifty-seven countries
(compare to fifty-two in 2014) are considered flawed
democracies, forty countries (compared to thirty-nine in 2014)
are considered hybrid regimes, while fifty-one countries
(compare to fifty-two in 2014) are considered authoritarian
regimes.145 Around 2.6 billion people, the report states, or over
one-third of the world’s population, live in a country under
authoritarian rule.146 Taken together with hybrid regimes, over

142. See Ved P. Nanda, Agora: U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors
or Human Rights Activists? (The Validity of United States Intervention in
Panama Under International Law), 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 494, 498–500 (1990); see
also Varayudej, supra note 24, at 12.
143. Petersen, supra note 121, at 37.
144. Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the
“Deplorables”, THE ECONOMIST: INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2017), at 1,
https://www.eiu.com/democracy2016.
145. Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and Its
Discontents, THE ECONOMIST: INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2017), at 2,
https://www.eiu.com/democracy2014; Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy
Index 2016, supra note 144, at 3.
146. Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2016, supra note 144, at
3.
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forty percent of the world population does not live in a
democratic regime, either full or flawed.147 The Economist
Intelligence Unit also reveals a disturbing trend of regressing
previously-attained progress in recent years.148 Indeed, Magen
demonstrated how “the global democratic wave hit the shoal
somewhere around 1999–2000, plateaued between 2000 and
2005, and has since suffered sustained reversals. By 2015 the
condition of global democratic institutions and procedures
declined for nine consecutive years.”149
This is the sad reality of the world we live in, albeit the
optimistic assertions of some international scholars. While in
Western countries and a number of non-Western countries the
right to democracy exists in practice, a large portion of the
world’s population still live in non-democratic and authoritarian
regimes, some of which can be described as outlaws.150 We are
surely aware of the problem that such categorization of
democracy “has been on Western terms and has been unequal;
many emerging states have found it nearly impossible to adhere
to the Western model.”151 In this Article, we focus first on the
narrower procedural aspect of democracy; on electoral
democracy, which ought to be more acceptable. We argue that if
international law was meant to protect these people, it failed;
the UDHR is lacking and reflects a compromise with the Soviet
Regime. Although the ICCPR adequately preaches democratic
systems (notwithstanding the missing emphasis on multiparty
systems), many of the member states do not have one in practice.
In the General Assembly and other U.N. institutions, the voices
of non-democratic states are loudly heard, and countries that are
a part of the Human Rights Council violate Article 25 of the
ICCPR every day.152
Of course, one of the biggest problems of international law

147. Id. at 2.
148. Id. at 3–4.
149. Magen, supra note 7, at 369.
150. Steiner, supra note 41, at 82.
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is enforcement.153 And herein lies one of the obstacles: it is easier
to enforce international human rights law upon democratic
regimes which demonstrate a broad pattern of cooperation and
compliance than upon non-democratic and outlaw states.154
Unfortunately, research shows that human rights treaties have
not systematically improved human rights outcomes.155 In fact,
certain authoritarian regimes have actually engaged in more
violations after ratifying human rights treaties.156 While only a
few dozen states ratified the ICCPR during its birth in 1976, by
2012, almost 170 countries have ratified it.157 However, the
average global political rights score as measured by Freedom
House has only moderately improved.158 One should realize that
in the current composition of the U.N., there is hardly a chance
for Article 25 to be enforced and applied in non-democratic and
outlaw states.159
V. A MODEST AND LESS MODEST PROPOSAL
A. MULTIPARTY AND PLURALIST ELECTORAL SYSTEM
One of the hypothetical solutions could be amending Article
25(b) of the ICCPR—explicating the meaning of “genuine”
elections by inserting, after the word “genuine,” the term
“multiparty and pluralist” to the obliging characteristics of the
electoral system.160 This process can be useful because “genuine”
democratic states would be willing to join such an amendment,
and “non-genuine” democratic states would hesitate before
joining such a treaty. Nevertheless, amending Article 25(b)
carries with it three major problems. First, the process of renegotiation of the treaty amendment and bringing the amended
treaty into force for all the parties can be protracted, which often
153. Hannum, supra note 34, at 292.
154. See, e.g., SRINI SITARAMAN, STATE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
TREATY REGIMES 7 (2009).
155. ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 73–78 (2014).
156. Id. at 73–77.
157. Id. at 73.
158. Id. at 74–75. The average global political rights score has improved
from 2.61 to 3.65. The scale ranges from one (the worst) to seven (the best). Id.
159. Id. at 73–77.
160. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations of 1986 art. 40, June 26, 1987, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (showing the procedure of amending multilateral treaties);
ICCPR, supra note 35, at 185–86.
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can be more difficult than the negotiation and enforcement of the
original treaty.161 Second, the new amendment, upon its coming
into forces, shall only be binding upon those States Parties which
have accepted it.162 Other state parties would still be bound by
the provisions of the original Covenant but not by amendments
which they have not accepted.163 Third, such a move might
create a negative arrangement according to which the current
terminology of Article 25 excludes multiparty elections.164 This
is an undesirable result.
The more modest and effective solution is to focus on the
interpretation of Article 25.165 The appropriate interpretation of
the ICCPR is that elections must “provide voters with a free
choice among legitimate alternatives.”166 If this is indeed the
case, international law must make a clear statement that singleparty elections and alike are incompatible with genuine
elections as they cannot guarantee the “free will of the electors”
as required by Article 25(b).167 As Robert Goodin claimed,
“insofar as the citizens’ choice is limited to a single party and a
single programme, the citizens cannot really make a choice . . .
so one-party democracy is undemocratic.”168 This should be
made clear and expressly stated by the Human Rights
Committee which publishes its interpretation of the content of
human
rights
provisions,
which
are
considered
“authoritative.”169 It would also be valuable if this interpretation
would be accompanied by an unequivocal declaration by the
United Nations General Assembly.170 But such an interpretation
and a General Assembly declaration would not have a binding

161. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2d ed. 2010).
162. ICCPR, supra note 35, at 186. See Robert Y. Jennings, Treaties, in
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kas_10560-1522-2-30.pdf?070328103113.
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force.171 Here, we can learn an important lesson from the
Helsinki Accord.
B. LESSONS FROM THE HELSINKI ACCORD
Franck claimed that there must be consequences when the
government refuses to conduct free and fair elections or abide by
their results, and that these consequences are in the form of
“sanctions, blockade or military intervention in limited
circumstances.”172 We are not advocating in favor of such
enforcement mechanisms. An emphasis on the correct
construction of a “genuine” electoral democracy would not get rid
of despotic regimes overnight, but it would be a significant
declaration of principle and as such constitute an initial step
that may help democratic elements in non-democratic societies
overcome despots.173 Studies demonstrate that in some
countries, international human rights treaties had an impact on
the public awareness, creating the belief that the government
should comply with treaties it has ratified.174 Likewise, an
international recognition of a right could have an influence in
the internal-domestic sphere; especially in regimes with buds of
democracy, even a toothless declaration can foster
democratization processes.175
Additionally, there is a notable precedent which
demonstrates the success of soft law.176 The Helsinki Accords—
signed in 1975 by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—formed important principles to reduce the
cold war tensions in Europe by including a specific section on
171. Id. at 12.
172. Franck, supra note 1, at 85.
173. Larry Diamond, Chasing Away the Democracy Blues: Why Democracy
is Worth Fighting For—Now More Than Ever, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 24, 2014,
3:33 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/24/chasing-away-the-democracyblues/.
174. POSNER, supra note 155, at 72–76.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development
and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 856 (1989);
Christine Chinkin, A Mirage in the Sand? Distinguishing Binding and NonBinding Relations Between States, 10 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 223, 246–47 (1997);
DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 345–46 (2000); Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421, 447–48 (2000); Dinah L. Shelton, Soft Law, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (ROUTLEDGE PRESS, 2008).
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fundamental rights and recognizing principles such as
territorial integrity of States and peaceful settlements of
disputes.177 In principle VII of the Accords, the participating
states agree to “act in conformity with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and to “fulfil their
obligations as set forth in the international declarations and
agreements . . . including, inter alia, the International
Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.”178
Since the Accords does not have binding force as an international
treaty,179 the affirmation by the former Soviet Union of its
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms was
dismissed at the time as mere verbiage and the Soviet leaders
saw it as a victory for the communist cause.180 The West
recognized its limitations and received in return a vague and
unenforceable promise to respect human rights.181
However, these non-binding documents can have a legal
significance and even become binding customary international
law.182 Even non-binding agreements can have an authoritative
and controlling force.183 Undeniably, the Helsinki Accords
eventually proved these claims as to the recognition of human
rights, encouraging domestic Soviet opposition groups and
indirectly helping those groups topple the Soviet despots.184 As
Dimitrijevic remarks with regard to the Accords, “the signatory
States would not risk political and moral responsibility . . . by
not complying with the agreed obligations . . . . Constant
reminders by the public abroad and at home threaten a nation’s
prestige, which is in itself an element of power to be neglected
177. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Accords].
178. See id. Principle VII; Antonio Cassese, The Approach of the Helsinki
Declaration to Human Rights, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 288–90 (1980);
Richard N. Dean, Beyond Helsinki: The Soviet View of Human Rights in
International Law, 21 VA. J. INT’L. L. 55, 88–91 (1980-1981); Alexander C. Kiss
& Mary F. Dominick, The International Legal Significance of the Human Rights
Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293, 309 (1980).
179. Jordan J. Paust, Transnational Freedom of Speech: Legal Aspects of the
Helsinki Final Act, 45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (1982); Kiss & Dominick,
supra note 178, at 309.
180. Dean, supra note 178, at 88–91.
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Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 300–01, 304 (1977).
184. Dean, supra note 178, at 91–95.
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only at one’s own peril.”185 The name “Helsinki” became the
rallying cry in the fight against the Kremlin. Whether or not the
Helsinki Accords hastened the opposition struggle has not been
definitively answered, but at the very least it provided them with
“ideological ammunition” and significant international support,
based upon the Soviet Union explicit obligation.186 Words have a
force of their own when they are included in international
agreements, non-binding treaties, and a fortiori binding
treaties.187
C. OBLIGATORY MONITORING SYSTEM
International law’s modest approach to democracy must
focus on genuine elections through which popular consent may
manifest itself.188 The clarification of the meaning of “genuine
elections” is a necessary step for promoting the right to
democracy, but it is insufficient.189 What is required is a general
and obligatory international monitoring of elections.190 Franck
notes that the U.N.’s mission to oversee the elections in Haiti in
1990 can be understood “as the first instance in which the United
Nations, acting at the request of a national government,
intervened in the electoral process solely to validate the
legitimacy of the outcome.”191 Since then, international election
monitoring has become a widespread practice.192 Global and
regional international organizations are increasingly involved in
observing national elections and the U.N. has developed
important election-monitoring activities and institutions.193 In
2005, the secretariat of the U.N. endorsed the Declaration of
Principles for International Election Observation,194 and in
185. Vojin Dimitrijevic, The Place of Helsinki on the Long Road to Human
Rights, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 253, 272–73 (1980).
186. CHRISTIAN PETERSON, GLOBALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: PRIVATE
CITIZENS, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE WEST 101 (2012).
187. LEENA GROVER, UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND
LEGITIMACY 102 (2012).
188. Fox, supra note 43, at 49.
189. Id. at 55–59.
190. Id. at 85–86.
191. Franck, supra note 1, at 72–73.
192. Id. at 82.
193. Id. at 65.
194. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at Ceremony of Endorsement for
Principles of International Electoral Observation (Oct. 27, 2005),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2005-10-27/secretary-generalsremarks-ceremony-endorsement-principles.
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2011, the General Assembly adopted the Resolution on
Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing
Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of
Democracy, which, inter alia, acknowledges “the importance of
international election observation for the promotion of free and
fair elections and its contribution to enhancing the integrity of
election processes.”195 However, international law does not
require international observation of elections.196 Such
observation is exercised upon the invitation of states, i.e., it is
voluntary, and unfortunately, still exceptional.197 Apart from
overcoming the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention,
such consent to monitoring serves another function: requiring all
major political groups to agree to the U.N. presence encourages
negotiation and participation of all major parties in the
agreement to monitoring.198 Nonetheless, as Franck rightly
observed, “few states are likely to volunteer as long as
participation in international monitoring is tantamount to a
government’s admission that it does not have credibility with its
own people.”199 We argue that international observation of
national elections must become a general obligation in which all
states participate; it ought to be “an unremarkable universal
habit.”200
There are some regional antecedents supporting our
approach. Some intergovernmental organizations (such as the
OSCE or the African Union Department of Election Assistance)
have required member-states to permit international
observation of elections.201
We are aware that this proposal for obligatory international
observation mechanisms of elections within independent states
may be considered intrusive and in conflict with the principle of
non-intervention.202 It requires a dual attitude shift from both
the U.N. and states; the U.N. must no longer consider election
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monitoring as an “exceptional activity of the organization.”203
The U.N. wants to reduce its role in monitoring elections, since
the presupposition is that “a decline in demand for United
Nations assistance would indicate that the Organization has
fulfilled its role successfully and can focus on other important
elements of the democratization process such as post-election
follow-up and institutionalization.”204 But the international
community still faces momentous challenges in enhancing the
right to political participation and promoting democracy. It
should be clear that the promotion of genuine democracy is not
an exhibit of disrespect for state sovereignty but rather a
reflection of deep commitment to popular self-rule, guided by the
principle of self-determination.205 From the states’ perspective,
election monitoring must be “reconciled in the minds of
governments with their residual sovereignty.”206 In order for the
interference with the principle of non-intervention to be minimal
yet maintain an effective monitoring mechanism, several
conditions must be met: first, all states must unequivocally
repudiate the use of military force—not in accordance with
existing international rules—to compel compliance with the
right to democracy.207 Second, the validity of the election’s
results will not be dependent upon the monitoring report. It
should be the governments’ own understanding that election
monitoring mechanisms are a useful tool to bestow legitimacy to
their democratic elections.208 Third, the obligatory monitoring
mechanisms must be limited to “observation” and not
“supervision.” The latter is the direct involvement in the
election’s machinery. The former is a less direct involvement
which aims to insure free and fair elections.209 Of course, upon
the request of the states themselves, the U.N.’s assistance can
simultaneously include a more refined mission that would assist
with the design and operation of the electoral process.210 Finally,
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
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in the end of this observation mission, a report would be issued,
which describes the process’s fairness and certifies that the
elections were free, fair and ultimately, genuine.211
The goal would be to make the results of the monitoring
transparent and globally published, and to shift the world’s focus
and pressure on those countries which do not conduct genuine
elections.212 Since the monitoring system should have no formal
influence upon an individual election’s results, it is still
respectful of state’s sovereignty, yet remains faithful to
international obligations.213
Importantly, procedural democracy is merely the starting
point and we should emphasize that the substance of democratic
governance must not be reduced to mere electoralism.214
However, “embracing periodic genuine elections as a foundation
of international governmental legitimacy is important evidence
of the widespread acceptance of democracy, both as a right and
a human heritage. Elections neither ensure democracy, nor,
even more broadly, do they establish peace, security, freedom, or
justice; yet, elections clarify and reaffirm those aspirations,”215
as long as the process is genuine.216
VI.

CONCLUSION

We wish to conclude our Article where we began it—with
the Arab Spring. Gerald Butt recently wrote that “the reality is
that Arab democracy has made little progress thus far in
breaking patterns of leadership established during long decades
of autocratic rule. The Arab Spring promised much, but thus far
it has achieved little.”217 In Egypt, notwithstanding presidential

211. Id. at 515.
212. See, e.g., id. (explaining the development of the democracy).
213. See Kofele-Kale, supra note 80, at 233 (claiming that the limited
involvement should mitigate the fears of critics who claim that international
observance of elections might be used “to certify bad leadership or promote the
interests of foreigners”).
214. U.N. Secretary-General, Support by the United Nations System of the
Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored
Democracies, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/52/513 (Oct. 21, 1997).
215. Ibrahim J. Gassama, Ballots and Bullets: The Right to Democratic
Governance in International Law After the Egyptian Coup, 32 WIS. J. INT’L L.
621, 662 (2014).
216. Id. at 673.
217. Gerald Butt, Why Arab Spring Has not Delivered Real Democracy, BBC
(June 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27632777.

176

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

and parliamentary elections and three referendums, the
military and security services remain the power behind these
displays of democracy.218 In Syria, the one-party Presidential
elections are taking place in the absence of free debate or a
serious competitor to Bashar al-Assad and are merely a
formality.219 And in Libya, the chances of an inclusive
democratic system taking root in the foreseeable future seems
remote.220 Tunisia is the only democratic success story.221 In
Arab countries that were largely untouched by the Arab
uprisings, such as Iraq and Lebanon, the democratic processes
have been distorted by sectarianism, and the electorate is denied
the opportunity to choose candidates espousing the common
good of the nation as a whole.222 Democracy in Algeria is
practiced under the shadow of the military and the interests of
the ruling elite, and in Jordan and Morocco, the Monarchs still
control the political life.223 At present, Butt concludes,
Arab countries . . . are practising democracy in different
ways and to differing degrees. But one vital ingredient is
missing—politics in its broadest sense . . . . When
elections become a contest among competing political
visions, then the annual calendar of voting dates in the
Arab Middle East will have real meaning.224
International law instruments have advanced the right to
procedural democracy. Yet, we still live in a largely nondemocratic world. As Pippa Norris writes, “the core principles of
electoral integrity have been long endorsed by the international
community, but unless the standards of elections reflect these
principles, by eliminating common malpractice and enforcing
human rights, contests will fail to strengthen democracy and
reduce conflict.”225 The data that Magen provides is a source for
great concern. Since 2006, there has been no net expansion in
the number of electoral democracies, and the number of electoral
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and liberal democracies has actually slightly declined.226 The
average level of freedom in the world has slightly declined as
well.227 Additionally, between 2000 and 2015, 17.6 of world
democracies broke down, by means of coups, fixed elections,
etc.—a very high percentage compared with relatively low rates
of eight percent from 1984–1993, and eleven percent from 1994–
2003.228 With the risk to the erosion of the right to democracy,
international law must take progressive action. Insisting on the
correct interpretation to the meaning of “genuine election” as
explicitly including multiparty and pluralist electoral
systems,229 coupled with a global monitoring system of elections,
as we propose in this article, should provide powerful means for
the real promotion and protection of the right to genuine
electoral democracy.
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